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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores two important dimensions of the relationship 
between transnational arbitration and litigation. First, what is the 
relationship between arbitration and litigation as alternative methods 
of transnational dispute resolution? Some scholars and practitioners 
argue that arbitration has largely replaced litigation as the method of 
choice for transnational dispute resolution.1 But others suggest that 
this view may overestimate the ascendance of arbitration and 
underestimate the continued importance of litigation.2 Second, what is 
                                                 
∗  Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  I 
thank Artemis Vamianakis, Daniel Burton, and Amanda White for outstanding 
research assistance. 
1  See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and 
Destiny, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 
MERCHANT 23 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., revised vol. 1998) (“[t]he status of 
arbitration as the procedure of choice in transnational commerce can no longer be 
seriously challenged”); Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public 
Policy in Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed. 1987) (referring to arbitration 
as “‘the’ ordinary and normal method of settling disputes of international trade”), 
cited in Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark, Empirical Perspectives on 
International Commercial Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 25, 36 (Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Richard W. Naimark eds. 2005). 
2  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: 
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly 
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352 (2007) (finding that there is a 
“paucity of arbitration clauses, even in international contracts”); Michael McIlwrath 
& Roland Schroeder, The View from an International Arbitration Customer: In Dire 
Need of Early Resolution, 74 ARB. 3, 10 (2008) (noting a “[m]ovement towards 
courts and away from international arbitration” and “a real reluctance [among in-
house counsel] to resolve disputes through international arbitration where it can be 
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the role of domestic courts in the transnational arbitration system?  
While some observers argue that transnational arbitration can operate 
independently from domestic legal institutions,3 others emphasize 
arbitration’s reliance on those institutions.4 
 
The answers to these questions matter for practice, policy, and 
theory. Practically, the answers matter for the dispute resolution 
choices of transnational actors and their lawyers. If arbitration has 
largely replaced litigation as a method of transnational dispute 
resolution, and if arbitration operates largely without the added costs 
of judicial involvement, the implication might be drawn that 
arbitration is presumptively the better choice. On the other hand, if 
litigation continues to be widely used, the implication might instead 
                                                                                                                  
avoided,” and raising the concern that “the lack of corporate satisfaction means 
[international arbitration] will not grow as much or as quickly as its potential would 
otherwise allow”); Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the 
Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 449, 451 (2008) 
(arguing that “the conventional wisdom may overestimate the extent to which 
transnational arbitration has replaced litigation”). 
3 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational 
Governance, 13 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 627, 637 (2006) (citing THOMAS 
CARBONNEAU, LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW 
LAW MERCHANT (1997)) (“proponents of the Lex Mercatoria argue that state 
authorities have largely ‘relinquished their authority to regulate’ transnational 
contracting and arbitration, permitting both ‘to function autonomously’ in what is, 
in effect, an ‘a-national’ way”) [hereinafter, Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance]; 
see also Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration in the Shadow of the Law, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW Vol. 1 93, 95 (1998); Alec Stone Sweet, 
Islands of Transnational Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 
323, 325 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002) [hereinafter Stone Sweet, 
Islands]. 
4  See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 139 (1992) (“International commercial 
arbitration is a form of private international dispute resolution based on a network of 
public international agreements. It is neither self-sustaining nor autonomous . . . .”); 
Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 267 (2001-02) (“[I]nternational commercial arbitration still 
relies very much on the support of national legal systems. The ultimate authority for 
arbitration procedures is that they are recognized and supported by national 
legislative and judicial processes. Without the power of state legal systems behind 
them, a party who expects to do poorly in the arbitration will have no incentive to 
comply and may seek recourse to national legal systems. Consequently, 
international commercial arbitration operates very much ‘in the shadow of the law,’ 
and national laws continue to impose important limits.”). 
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be that the appropriate method of transnational dispute resolution 
ultimately depends on the circumstances, and that litigation remains 
appropriate in many of those circumstances. In terms of policy, efforts 
to reform arbitration might seem more urgent if many parties still 
prefer litigation, or if judicial involvement in the transnational 
arbitration system is either excessive or insufficient to ensure 
adequate monitoring of the system’s integrity. Theoretically, our 
understanding of how transnational actors resolve disputes is at stake, 
as is our understanding of the interaction between private and public 
forms of transnational dispute resolution. 
 
So far, however, much of what lawyers and scholars understand 
about the relationship between transnational arbitration and litigation 
is not based on systematic empirical evidence.5  This is not surprising: 
little existing data is available to clarify this relationship, and new 
data is costly and difficult to obtain. The result is considerable 
uncertainty about the validity of contending claims about the status of 
arbitration and litigation. 
 
This article’s goal is to shed empirical light on the arbitration-
litigation relationship in transnational dispute resolution by making 
the most of currently available data from the U.S. federal courts. Part 
II begins by seeking clues about the extent to which arbitration has 
replaced litigation as a method of transnational dispute resolution.  To 
that end, it analyzes data on transnational litigation in the U.S. federal 
courts and transnational arbitration in the world’s leading arbitral 
institutions. This data has not previously been analyzed comparatively.  
Part II thus provides new evidence regarding relative trends in these 
two dispute resolution methods. The analysis suggests that 
transnational litigation rates have been declining while transnational 
arbitration rates have been increasing. However, the analysis also 
shows that litigation continues to be a widely used method of 
transnational dispute resolution, even in contract disputes. For 
example, from 2000 to 2005, the number of transnational contract 
cases filed in the U.S. district courts alone was roughly the same as 
                                                 
5 Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from 
Arbitration? 3 (Aug. 11, 2008) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147697) 
(calling for “systematic study of changes in the use of arbitration clauses over time” 
rather than relying on evidence that “consists largely of anecdotes”).  For a leading 
effort to address this empirical gap, see TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 25, 36 (Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Richard W. Naimark eds. 2005). 
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the number of transnational cases filed for arbitration with the 
American Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of 
Commerce combined.6  Simply put, arbitration has yet to fully eclipse 
litigation; to the contrary, both arbitration and litigation remain 
important methods of transnational dispute resolution. 
 
The article next assesses judicial involvement in transnational 
arbitration through post-award litigation.  To do so, it uses an original 
dataset of 199 published U.S. federal court decisions in cases 
involving arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
“New York Convention”).7  Part III uses the dataset to estimate post-
award litigation rates. Although some observers argue that it is 
generally unnecessary to seek judicial enforcement, the results 
suggest that there is actually considerable judicial involvement at the 
post-award stage of the transnational arbitration process.   
 
Using the same dataset, Part IV analyzes the rate at which U.S. 
federal courts enforce arbitral awards covered by the New York 
Convention in order to evaluate whether the judicial involvement 
discussed in Part III tends to support or undermine transnational 
arbitration.8  Prior scholarship suggests that non-enforcement is rare.  
However, the results indicate that the enforcement rate in published 
decisions since 1970 is less than 75 percent, and has decreased from 
approximately 83 percent in the 1990s to about 68% in the 2000s.9  
On the one hand, this finding may be discouraging from the 
perspective of one important arbitral value: the finality of awards.  On 
the other hand, it may be encouraging from the perspective of 
scholars and practitioners who are calling for enhanced judicial 
monitoring of the integrity of the transnational arbitration system.  
Because enforcement rates in published court decisions are not 
necessarily the same as enforcement rates in unpublished court 
                                                 
6  See infra Table 1 and accompanying discussion. 
7  The full text of the New York Convention is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.  
8  For a broader discussion of the role of domestic courts in supporting or hindering 
arbitration and other transnational private institutions, see Christopher A. Whytock, 
Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TULANE L. REV. pt. II.C.2 
(forthcoming 2009). 
9  See infra Tables 4 and 5 and accompanying discussion. 
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decisions, it is uncertain whether Part IV’s findings can be 
generalized to U.S. federal court decisions overall.  But published 
decisions merit special attention because they can influence the 
dispute resolution behavior of transnational actors beyond the parties 
to particular disputes, and disproportionately affect public perceptions 
of transnational arbitration. 
 
To develop a sound understanding of transnational dispute 
resolution, it will be necessary to reach far more precise and certain 
conclusions about the arbitration-litigation relationship. This, in turn, 
will require analysis of additional, more costly, and more difficult-to-
obtain data.  By providing clues based on currently available data, this 
article provides a point of departure for that endeavor. 
 
II.  TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION RATES 
 
Some scholars argue that arbitration has substantially replaced 
litigation as a method of transnational dispute resolution.10 However, 
little data is available for assessing that view.  A recent empirical 
study revealed surprising low levels of arbitration clauses in the 
international contracts of U.S. public companies.11 But that study 
neither captures arbitration trends over time12 nor compares 
transnational arbitration rates to transnational litigation rates. This 
Part seeks to shed brighter empirical light on comparative trends in 
transnational litigation and transnational arbitration. 
 
Specifically, this Part explores the relationship between arbitration 
and litigation as alternative methods of transnational dispute 
resolution. This relationship matters for practice, policy, and theory.  
Insofar as arbitration has replaced litigation, one might reasonably 
conclude that arbitration is presumptively the better method for 
resolving transnational disputes. Insofar as litigation persists, 
                                                 
10  See supra note 1. 
11  Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 350-352 (finding that only 20% of 
international contracts—defined as contracts including a non-U.S. party—contain 
arbitration clauses). 
12  Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 5, at 3 (arguing that “static examinations of the 
use of arbitration clauses” such as the Eisenberg & Miller study “do not show 
‘flight’—i.e., that parties who previously agreed to arbitration are now switching to 
litigation”).  The Drahozal & Wittrock study compares the incidence of arbitration 
clauses over time, but in franchise agreements rather than international contracts. 
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however, the implication is that the appropriate method depends on 
the circumstances, and that in some cases litigation continues to offer 
advantages to transnational actors.13 From a policy perspective, 
whether and how urgently arbitration should be promoted as an 
alternative to litigation depends on this relationship. Any reform 
efforts aimed at improving transnational arbitration would seem more 
urgent if litigation remains an important competitor than if arbitration 
has already substantially replaced litigation. Theoretically, the 
relationship has implications for scholars’ efforts to understand 
whether the rise of arbitration is part of a broader shift from public to 
private forms of transnational governance.14 To examine this 
relationship, this Part undertakes a comparative analysis of data on 
transnational litigation in the U.S. federal courts and transnational 
arbitration in the world’s leading arbitral institutions. 
 
A.   The Data 
 
As an indicator of transnational litigation rates, this Part uses 
Federal Judicial Center data on the annual number of alienage cases 
terminated in the U.S. district courts.15 Alienage cases are cases over 
which the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction because the 
action “is between . . . citizens of a [U.S.] State and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state.”16  They are transnational in the sense that 
                                                 
13  See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 4-15 (2d ed. 2006) (outlining the 
“numerous considerations” that should affect the choice between arbitration and 
litigation and arguing that “[i]t would be highly imprudent to prescribe a single 
dispute resolution mechanism for all transactions or parties. There are too many 
variables, which counsel in different directions in different transactions for different 
parties”); RICHARD GARNETT, HENRY GABRIEL, JEFF WAINCYMER & JUDD EPSTEIN, 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11 (2000) 
(“[t]here is no dispute settlement method that is optimal in all situations”). 
14  See, e.g., Stone Sweet, Transnational Governance and Stone Sweet, Islands, 
supra note 3 (arguing that arbitration can be understood as a form of transnational 
private governance); see also Whytock, supra note 2 (comparing arbitration as a 
form of transnational private governance to transnational judicial governance). 
15  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATABASE 
SERIES 1992-2005.  This database incorporates data collected by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, and is available from the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
16 See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2) (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of a [U.S.] State 
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they involve parties of different nationalities. However, alienage cases 
are not the only type of transnational litigation in U.S. courts.  In the 
U.S. federal courts, there are also transnational diversity cases 
between citizens of different U.S. states which arise out of activity 
with connections to one or more foreign states, or involve foreign 
citizens as additional parties;17 suits involving foreign sovereigns;18 
and suits over which there is federal question,19 admiralty,20 or 
                                                                                                                  
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”).  To identify alienage cases, I used the 
Federal Judicial Center database’s residence variable, which is a two digit number.  
The first digit indicates whether the plaintiff is a foreign citizen and the second 
indicates whether the defendant is a foreign citizen.  I counted a case as an alienage 
case only if the plaintiff is a foreign citizen and the defendant is a U.S. citizen, or if 
the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and the defendant is a foreign citizen.  I did not count 
foreign sovereigns as “foreign citizens” for purpose of this analysis. 
17  28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1) (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States”); 28 
U.S.C. §1332(a)(3) (providing jurisdiction over suits between “citizens of different 
States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties”). 
18  See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(4) (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between a foreign state, defined in section 1603 
(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States”); 28 U.S.C. 
§1330 (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount 
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 
1603 (a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or 
under any applicable international agreement”); 28 U.S.C. §1351 (“[t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all civil actions 
and proceedings against: (1) consuls or vice consuls of foreign states; or (2) members 
of a mission or members of their families (as such terms are defined in section 2 of the 
Diplomatic Relations Act)”). 
19  28 U.S.C. §1331 (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).  Thus, 
the data does not include transnational litigation involving agreements to arbitrate or 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention.  See 9 U.S.C. §203 (“[a]n action or 
proceeding falling under the [New York] Convention shall be deemed to arise under 
the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States . . . 
shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the 
amount in controversy”). 
20  28 U.S.C. §1333 (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive 
of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime 
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are 
otherwise entitled; (2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings 
for the condemnation of property taken as prize”). 
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bankruptcy jurisdiction,21 or jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort 
Statute.22 There also is transnational litigation in U.S. state courts.23  
Therefore, even if the alienage case data captures a large portion of 
transnational litigation in the United States, overall transnational 
litigation rates are almost certainly higher.24 Although the Federal 
Judicial Center data does not identify these other types of transnational 
litigation, alienage litigation rates are useful as an indicator of 
minimum transnational litigation rates in the United States.   
 
To estimate transnational arbitration rates, this Part uses data 
collected by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(HKIAC) on the number of cases filed with 11 different international 
arbitral institutions.25  The HKIAC has collected this data since 1992.  
                                                 
21  28 U.S.C. §1334 (“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district 
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11”). 
22  28 U.S.C. §1350 (“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States”). 
23  Litigation rates are far higher in U.S. state courts than in U.S. federal courts.  
Compare ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
Table S-7 (2007) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/complete 
judicialbusiness.pdf) (253,273 civil cases were filed in the U.S. district courts in 
2005) with NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 
27 (2006) (available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2006_files/ 
EWSC-2007WholeDocument.pdf) (an estimated 16.6 million cases were filed in 
U.S. state courts in the same year). Based on this comparison, one might 
hypothesize that there is even more transnational litigation in state courts than 
federal courts.  However, there is reason to question this hypothesis: It is likely that 
plaintiffs (particularly foreign plaintiffs) prefer the federal courts for transnational 
litigation, and that defendants (particularly foreign defendants) will frequently seek 
removal of state court transnational suits to federal court.  Unfortunately, there 
appear to be no data on transnational litigation in states courts that can be used to 
test these propositions systematically. 
24  Cf. GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 71 (2003) (“Article III 
contemplates federal court jurisdiction of claims ‘arising under’ federal law 
(commonly known as ‘federal question’ jurisdiction).  Although many cases that we 
would consider to be transnational do in fact arise under the US Constitution, a 
federal statute or a treaty, not all of them do. . . . Diversity jurisdiction (especially 
‘alienage jurisdiction,’ covering suits between a US national and a non-national) 
will encompass a good many transnational disputes, but, again, certainly not all.”). 
25  HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, STATISTICS: INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION CASES RECEIVED (available at http://www.hkiac.org/HKIAC/ 
HKIAC_English/en_statistics.html). The included institutions are the American 
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Because these data include cases filed with all of the major 
international arbitral institutions—including the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
and the London Court of International Arbitration (the LCIA)—they 
likely capture a substantial portion of transnational arbitration.   
 
It is only a rough estimate of overall worldwide transnational 
arbitration rates, however.  First, because the data do not include ad 
hoc transnational arbitration—that is, transnational arbitration that 
does not take place under the auspices of a preexisting arbitral 
institution—they understate overall worldwide transnational 
arbitration rates.26  Second, the HKIAC data on filings with a number 
of arbitral institutions—including the ICC, the LCIA, the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), and the British Columbia International Commercial 
Arbitration Centre (BCICAC)—include domestic arbitrations,27 
which means the data overstate transnational arbitration rates in those 
institutions. 
 
B.   Analysis 
 
The results are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1.  Regarding trends 
over time, two findings are immediately clear.  First, the annual rate of 
U.S. alienage cases has declined sharply since 1992, from 4,374 to 
                                                                                                                  
Arbitration Association (AAA), the British Columbia International Commercial 
Arbitration Center (BCICAC), the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the HKIAC, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA), the 
Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre 
for Arbitration (KLRCA), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and the Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).  Portions of this data are also 
available in DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 5, at app. 1. 
26  See id at 7 (“data from a particular arbitration institution (or arbitration 
institutions as a whole) necessarily fail to give a complete picture of international 
arbitration practice because they exclude ad hoc arbitrations—proceedings not 
administered by an arbitration institution”).  There do not appear to be any existing 
data on ad hoc transnational arbitration rates.  Impressions about the extent of ad 
hoc arbitration relative to institutional arbitration run the gamut, with some 
observers opining that ad hoc arbitrations are few compared to institutional 
arbitrations, others suggesting that ad hoc and institutional rates are likely similar, 
and still others thinking that there may be far more ad hoc than institutional 
arbitration. Id. at 7, n. 28. 
27  See HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, supra note 25. 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Litigation (U.S. Alienage Cases Total)
Litigation (U.S. Alienage Cases, Contracts Only)
Arbitration (Major Institutions Total)
Arbitration (ICC Only)
1,976, with some indication that the rate may be starting to stabilize at 
about 2,000. Transnational actors continue to use litigation frequently, 
but not as frequently as before. Second, the aggregate annual rate of 
filings with the world’s major international arbitral institutions has 
increased steadily since 1992, from 1,148 to 2,785.  Insofar as trends in 
alienage litigation roughly follow overall transnational litigation trends 
and trends in institutional arbitration roughly follow overall 
transnational arbitration trends, the data indicate that litigation is 
decreasingly used and arbitration increasingly used as a method of 
transnational dispute resolution. The data suggest that these trends 
were already under way in the early 1990s; however, Figure 1 and 
Table 1 show that it was only in 2002 that institutional arbitration 
rates surpassed U.S. alienage litigation rates. Moreover, taken as a 
whole, litigation seems to have been prevalent during the period 
between 1992 and 2005: there were a total of 41,758 U.S. alienage 
cases, and 29,996 cases in the major arbitration institutions. 
 
Figure 1. Transnational Litigation and Transnational Arbitration 
Rates, 1992-2005 
 
To what extent is there a relationship between U.S. alienage 
litigation’s decline and institutional arbitration’s rise? On the one 
hand, the rise in arbitration rates might be attributable to arbitration of 
transnational disputes that previously would have been litigated; that 
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is, transnational arbitration may indeed be replacing transnational 
litigation. This probably explains a significant portion of the growth 
of transnational arbitration. But for two reasons, replacement seems to 
be only a partial explanation. First, arbitration and litigation are not 
entirely fungible. For some disputes, arbitration may be inappropriate; 
changes in litigation rates of such disputes would not necessarily 
imply changes in arbitration rates, because such disputes are not likely 
to be arbitrated anyway.28 For other disputes, litigation may be 
inappropriate; changes in arbitration rates of such disputes would not 
necessarily imply changes in litigation rates, because such disputes 
are not likely to be litigated anyway.29 Second, litigation and 
arbitration do not exhaust the available alternatives for transnational 
dispute resolution. Therefore, changes in litigation and arbitration 
rates may be partly due to changes in negotiation, conciliation, or 
mediation rates.30  In summary, the litigation decrease and arbitration 
increase appear strikingly correlated, but the extent to which they are 
causally related is unclear. 
 
Beyond general trends, what inferences can be drawn from the 
data regarding the relative importance of these two methods of 
transnational dispute resolution?  For several reasons, interpretation is 
difficult. First, the comparison is between transnational litigation in 
one country (the United States)—indeed, only one type of 
transnational litigation in that country (alienage litigation in the U.S. 
federal courts)—and worldwide institutional arbitration rates. Even if 
the U.S. federal courts attract a disproportionate amount of the 
world’s transnational litigation, and even if there is a substantial 
amount of ad hoc transnational arbitration, this comparison might be 
biased in favor of arbitration. Therefore, as an additional point of 
reference, Figure 1 and Table 1 also present arbitration rates in what 
is arguably the leading international arbitral institution, the ICC. 
                                                 
28  For example, tort litigation arising without a preexisting relationship between the 
disputants is unlikely to lead to arbitration because the disputants lacked an 
opportunity to enter an ex ante arbitration agreement. Therefore, one would not 
necessarily expect changes in tort litigation rates to have an impact on arbitration 
rates. 
29  For example, highly technical disputes arising out of contractual relationships, in 
connection with which confidentiality is essential, foreign enforcement of the 
resulting judgment is likely to be necessary, and both sides are seeking a neutral 
forum, are unlikely to be litigated. 
30  In addition, increases in 28 U.S.C. §1332’s amount in controversy requirement in 
1988 and 1996 may have contributed to the decline of alienage litigation rates. 
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Second, the likelihood of arbitration is higher in disputes arising 
from pre-existing relationships such as contracts, because the 
disputants have an opportunity to enter an ex ante arbitration 
agreement. Disputants can also agree to arbitration after disputes 
arise, but this is less common.31 The likelihood of arbitration is thus 
lower in disputes, such as many tort disputes, that arise outside the 
context of a preexisting relationship.  For this reason, a comparison 
with alienage litigation rates in contract disputes is arguably more 
appropriate than a comparison with alienage litigation rates overall.  
To facilitate this comparison, Figure 1 and Table 1 separately present 
alienage litigation rates in contract cases.32 
 
Using these alternative measures, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that 
alienage contract litigation rates in the U.S. federal courts are about 
twice the ICC arbitration rate, and that the difference between these 
rates has remained relatively steady since the early 2000s, ranging 
from about 500 to 600 cases annually. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, 
from 2000 to 2005, U.S. alienage contract litigation rates were 
roughly the same as ICC and AAA arbitration rates combined. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that litigation and arbitration are both 
important methods of transnational dispute resolution in contract 
cases. They also show that, so far at least, transnational contract 
litigation in the U.S. federal courts continues to outpace transnational 
arbitration in individual international arbitral institutions such as the 
ICC and the AAA. However, as Figure 1 clearly indicates, the total 
arbitration rate in the world’s major arbitral institutions far exceeds 
the alienage litigation rate in contract cases in the U.S. federal courts. 
 
 
                                                 
31  See BORN, supra note 13, at 37 (“Almost all international arbitrations occur 
pursuant to arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts. It is, of course, 
possible for parties to agree to submit an existing dispute to arbitration, and this 
sometimes happens. . . . Typically, however, it is difficult to negotiate a submission 
agreement [or “compromis”] once a concrete dispute has arisen and litigation tactics 
have been explored.”). 
32  By far most of these cases are categorized by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) as 
“other contract actions,” but there are also a large number of insurance and 
negotiable instrument cases. The FJC also separately tracks marine contract, 
overpayment and enforcement of judgment actions, and certain loan default actions, 
but these are not common in alienage cases. The FJC data do not include real estate 
disputes—including disputes over leases or foreclosures—as contract disputes.  See 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 15. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417627




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417627
&52 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REVIEW [VOL. 2:5 
 
Because the data are limited to only one type of transnational 
litigation in one country’s federal courts, and because the data do not 
include ad hoc transnational arbitration, it is difficult to generalize to 
overall transnational litigation and transnational arbitration rates 
worldwide.  For example, it is unclear whether the U.S. alienage 
litigation data understate overall worldwide transnational litigation 
rates to a greater extent than the institutional transnational 
arbitration rate understates overall worldwide transnational 
arbitration rates. Assuming that this difference exceeds the 
difference between the U.S. alienage litigation rates and the 
institutional arbitration rates presented in Table 1 (255, 302, 687 and 
809 cases for the years 2002 through 2005, respectively, as set forth 
in the A-B column), then one could conclude that, in those years, 
litigation continued to outpace arbitration as a method of 
transnational dispute resolution worldwide.33 This assumption does 
not seem unreasonable; but until more data are available, this must 
ultimately remain a matter of speculation. 
 
In summary, there has been a decline in U.S. alienage litigation 
rates in general and U.S. alienage litigation rates in contract cases in 
particular.  Meanwhile, arbitration rates in the world’s leading arbitral 
institutions have increased. The extent to which these trends are 
causally related is unclear; but the evidence is not inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that arbitration is replacing litigation as a method of 
transnational dispute resolution. Nevertheless, the evidence also 
reveals that litigation continues to be used frequently as a method of 
transnational dispute resolution, including in contract cases. It appears 
that, even as transnational arbitration rates have increased, 
transnational litigation remains important.   
 
III.   POST-AWARD LITIGATION IN THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
 
Part II examined the relationship between arbitration and litigation 
as alternative methods of transnational dispute resolution. This Part 
focuses on another important dimension of the relationship between 
arbitration and litigation: judicial involvement in the transnational 
arbitration process through post-arbitral award litigation.   
 
                                                 
33  Regarding contract disputes in particular, it would be necessary to make an 
assumption about the extent to which U.S. alienage contract litigation rates 
underestimate worldwide contract litigation rates. 
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A.   Post-Award Litigation and the Transnational Arbitration Process 
 
The three principal types of post-award litigation are proceedings 
to confirm, vacate, and enforce arbitral awards. Proceedings to 
confirm or vacate an award may only be brought in a court of the state 
in which or under the law of which the award was made (the “state of 
origin”).34 The purpose of a confirmation proceeding is to convert an 
arbitral award into a judgment of the confirming court, rendering it 
enforceable in the state of origin.35 Conversely, the purpose of a 
proceeding to vacate (or “set aside”) an arbitral award is to render the 
award unenforceable in the state of origin.36 The purpose of an 
enforcement proceeding is to enforce an arbitral award in a state other 
than the state of origin, presumably a state in which the award debtor 
has assets.37 
 
                                                 
34  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 465 (1994) (noting that “the [New York] 
Convention has been held by U.S. courts and other authorities to permit actions to 
vacate to be brought in either the arbitral situs or the country under whose laws the 
award was made” and referring to such a forum as the “country of origin”); 
BERMANN, supra note 24, at 405 (“The national courts of the arbitral situs have an 
important, and indeed exclusive, role to play in two types of procedure: the vacatur 
and confirmation of awards rendered locally.”). 
35  See id. (noting that “[m]ost jurisdictions—the U.S. among them—provide a 
procedure whereby an award rendered locally may be ‘confirmed.’  By confirmation 
is basically meant a reduction of the award to judgment, so that it has the same 
executory force and effect as a judgment of a local court.”); BORN, supra note 34, at 
462 (“If an arbitral award is confirmed by a U.S. court, . . . the [Federal Arbitration 
Act] provides that it becomes a judgment of the confirming court.  That judgment 
has the same effect as any other U.S. civil judgment and may be enforced as 
such.”). 
36  See BERMANN, supra note 24, at 406-407 (“If vacated, the award becomes 
unenforceable in the arbitral situs.”); BORN, supra note 34, at 463 (“If the action [to 
vacate] is successful, then the award is ‘vacated’ (or ‘annulled’); it ceases to have 
legal effect and cannot subsequently be confirmed or otherwise relied on in the 
forum.”). 
37 See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 203-204 (2008) (“[T]he award creditor may seek 
recognition and enforcement of the award in a jurisdiction where assets of the . . . 
award debtor are located.”  If the enforcement action is successful, “the award 
creditor may use whatever methods are normally used to collect the amount of the 
award, for example by seizing assets in accordance with legal procedures in the 
enforcing jurisdiction.”). 
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Under the New York Convention, there is a general presumption 
that each contracting state shall enforce “foreign” and “non-domestic” 
arbitral awards.38  For purposes of the Convention, foreign awards are 
arbitral awards made in a foreign state.39  However, the New York 
Convention leaves the definition of “non-domestic” up to the 
contracting states.40  Under U.S. law, non-domestic awards are awards 
arising out of relationships entirely between U.S. citizens but which 
involve “property located abroad, envisages performance or 
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or 
more foreign states.”41  In a proceeding to enforce a foreign or non-
domestic award in U.S. courts, the award debtor may argue that the 
award should not be enforced for one of the reasons specified in the 
New York Convention.42 
 
Post-award litigation brings courts into the arbitration process; 
but the consequences of judicial involvement are mixed.43  On the 
one hand, post-award litigation can benefit transnational arbitration.  
At a macro level, post-award litigation gives courts an opportunity 
to monitor the integrity of the arbitration system.  At a micro level, 
post-award litigation gives disputants an opportunity to seek judicial 
review—albeit a review of strictly limited scope—an opportunity 
                                                 
38 See New York Convention art. III (“Each Contracting State shall recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid 
down in the following articles.”). 
39  See New York Convention art. I(1) (“This Convention shall apply to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State 
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are 
sought . . . .”). 
40  See New York Convention art. I(1) (stating that the Convention “shall also apply 
to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought”). 
41  9 U.S.C. §202. 
42  The exceptions are set forth in articles V and VI of the New York Convention.  
“Thus, the losing party has two opportunities to challenge an award: first, in the 
court of the situs [in proceedings to vacate] and, second, in the court where the 
prevailing party is attempting to enforce the award against the assets of the losing 
party.”  MOSES, supra note 37, at 194. 
43  Another important incidence of judicial involvement in the transnational 
arbitration process which this article does not address is litigation to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate. 
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that otherwise would be missing in most cases given the lack of an 
ordinary arbitral appellate process.44 In these ways, judicial 
involvement can enhance the legitimacy and attractiveness of 
arbitration. On the other hand, excessive judicial involvement 
would be detrimental to the transnational arbitration system. Post-
award litigation adds time and expense to the arbitration process, 
thus reducing its efficiency. Too much post-award litigation would 
undermine basic arbitral values such as finality of awards and ease 
of enforcement, thus reducing the attractiveness of arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation.45 Perhaps more fundamentally, excessively 
high post-award litigation rates might indicate that the arbitration 
process has insufficient legitimacy to induce voluntary compliance 
and insufficient private mechanisms for enforcement of arbitral 
awards without recourse to the courts. Thus, an important 
challenge for the transnational arbitration system is to achieve 
adequate but not excessive levels of judicial involvement. So far, 
however, we know very little about post-award litigation rates. 
This Part provides some clues, using data on post-award litigation 
in the U.S. federal courts. 
 
B.   The Data 
 
The results of prior assessments of post-award litigation rates 
vary widely. On the one hand, the general sense among arbitration 
scholars seems to be that voluntary compliance rates are high and 
that post-award litigation is often unnecessary.46 A 2007-2008 
                                                 
44 See MOSES, supra note 37, at 4 (noting lack of a right of appeal). 
45  See id. at 3 (noting that “the likelihood of obtaining enforcement” is one of the 
two most significant advantages of arbitration and explaining that “[a]n arbitration 
award is generally easier to enforce internationally than a national court judgment 
because under the New York Convention, courts are required to enforce an award 
unless there are serious procedural irregularities, or problems that go to the integrity 
of the process”). See also BORN, supra note 13, at 6 (“it is generally (but not 
always) true that . . . arbitral awards are more easily and reliably enforced in foreign 
states than . . . foreign court judgments”). 
46  See, e.g., BORN, supra note 34, at 459-460 (“Most awards do not require either 
judicial enforcement or confirmation, because they are voluntarily complied with.”); 
BORN, supra note 13, at 115 (“Parties sometimes refuse to honor international 
arbitration awards against them, although anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
occurs less frequently than with foreign court judgments.”); MOSES, supra note 37, 
at 202 (“In many instances, a losing party will voluntarily comply with an 
arbitration award, so that enforcement proceedings will not be necessary.”). 
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survey of the experiences and attitudes of corporations toward 
transnational arbitration appears to provide some support for this 
view. The results indicate that only 19 percent of respondents had 
experienced an outcome in which an arbitral award was followed 
by enforcement proceedings or other post-award litigation.47 On 
the other hand, a 2003 survey on the post-award experience of 
claimants in 205 transnational arbitration cases filed with the AAA 
between 1999 and 2002, reveals considerable levels of post-award 
judicial involvement.  In 100 cases, the claimant prevailed and the 
award debtor eventually complied fully or partially with the 
award.48  Of those 100 cases, there was judicial confirmation of the 
award in 68 cases and judicial enforcement in 12 cases.49 Even 
then, full compliance was the result in only 74 of the 100 cases, 
while there was partial compliance in 4 cases and the parties 
renegotiated the award in 22 cases. Of the remaining 105 cases, the 
award debtor failed to comply in 35 cases; a court vacated the 
award in one case; 51 cases were still pending in a court action; 
                                                 
47  School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary, University of London & 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices 2008, at 6 (2008) (available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/ 
publications/international_arbitration_2008.html). The survey also indicated 
that 49% of respondents had experienced an outcome in which an arbitral award 
was followed by voluntary compliance, 25% had experienced settlement 
without an arbitral award, and 7% had experienced settlement with an arbitral 
award by consent.  The study summarizes these findings by stating that “81% of 
disputes are resolved without the intervention of a national court.” Id. However, 
the findings do not appear to support that statement because the relevant survey 
question (as described in the report) was not framed in terms of the percentage 
of disputes leading to different outcomes, but rather whether the organization 
has experienced such an outcome (“Has your organization experienced the 
following outcomes of arbitration?”).  Id.  Moreover, the survey does not appear 
to have asked respondents about the frequency of confirmation proceedings, 
which would be a significant omission, particularly in light of Naimark & 
Keer’s findings (based on parties in specific arbitration cases rather than general 
corporate experience and attitudes) that there was judicial confirmation in 68 of 
100 cases in which the award debtor complied fully or partially. 
48  Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-Award Experience in 
International Commercial Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 269, 271 (Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds. 2005). 
49  Id.  
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and the claimant lost in 18 cases.50 Thus, there is considerable 
uncertainty about post-award litigation rates. 
 
In an effort to reduce this uncertainty, this Part uses an original 
dataset based on a search of the Westlaw database for all U.S. federal 
court decisions since 1970 involving the confirmation or enforcement 
of arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention.51 The 
dataset includes proceedings involving awards covered by the New 
York Convention and made in the United States (including 
confirmation proceedings and proceedings to vacate), and 
proceedings involving foreign awards (which technically are 
enforcement proceedings);52 and it includes 145 U.S. District Court 
                                                 
50  Id.  As the authors note: “A total of 35 cases reported non-compliance with the 
award.  Fifty-one cases were unresolved at the time of the survey and were pending 
in a court action of some type. Those 51 cases tended to be the most recently 
awarded matters and had not, therefore, sufficiently ‘ripened’ to demonstrate a final 
result.  While we have no further data on the final outcomes of those 51 cases it 
seems likely that they will eventually show the same patterns of post-award results 
as the other 154 cases [i.e. compliance in 118 cases, non-compliance in 35 cases, 
award vacated in 1 case].”  Id.  
51  1970 is the year the United States implemented the New York Convention with 
the entry into effect of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  The enforcement 
decisions included in the dataset were identified in three steps.  First, a Keycite 
search was performed on October 10, 2008 in Westlaw for “9 U.S.C. §207”, with 
“Document Type” limited to “Highest Court” and “Other Courts.”  Section 207 is 
the provision of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) that authorizes U.S. 
courts to hear enforcement proceedings and requires them to enforce an award 
“unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or 
enforcement of the award specified in the [New York] Convention.”  This search 
resulted in 299 hits.  Second, the following query was made in the Westlaw “All 
Cases” database: “(((“NEW YORK CONVENTION” /P ARBITRA!) 
(CONVENTION /S “FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD”)) & ((ART! /3 (V 5)) /P 
CONVENTION)) % ((9 /2 (USC U.S.C.) /2 207) (9 /2 (USCA U.S.C.A.) /2 207) 
((“FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT” FAA F.A.A.) /5 207))”. This query was 
aimed at identifying decisions involving arbitral awards covered by the New York 
Convention which refer to one or more of the exceptions to enforcement specified 
in Article V of the Convention, but which do not include references to Section 
207 of the FAA.  This search resulted in 93 hits.  Third, the results from the two 
queries were combined and then screened to identify and discard duplicate 
decisions and decisions that were not in fact decisions to confirm (or not confirm) 
or enforce (or not enforce) arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention.  
Screening was performed by a law student research assistant in consultation with 
the author. 
52  See BERMANN, supra note 24, at 406 (“The term ‘confirmation’ in the US is not 
accurately used when applied to awards issued on the territory, or under the lex 
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decisions and 54 U.S. Court of Appeals decisions, for a total of 199 
decisions.53 
This empirical strategy avoids some of the shortcomings of survey 
studies, including reliance on impressions and attitudes of respondents 
and assumptions about the validity of the underlying survey 
instruments. The dataset used in this Part has its own limitations, 
however, two of which merit special attention. First, the data only 
indicate minimum post-award litigation rates, because they include 
only published decisions, and only some decisions are published.  
Nevertheless, using assumptions about publication rates, it is possible 
to make reasonable estimates about the range within which overall 
post-award litigation rates are likely to fall. Second, the data only 
indicate absolute post-award litigation rates. It is unclear whether 
changes in these rates would reflect different patterns of judicial 
involvement, or simply changes in underlying arbitration rates.  After 
all, other things being equal, one would expect more arbitration to 
result in more post-award litigation. 
 
C.   Analysis 
 
Since 1970, approximately 45 U.S. Court of Appeals enforcement 
decisions involving arbitral awards covered by the New York 
Convention have been published in the Federal Reporter;54 but the 
vast majority of U.S. Court of Appeals decisions are not published in 
                                                                                                                  
arbitri, of a foreign jurisdiction.  Such awards require judicial ‘recognition’ and/or 
‘enforcement.’”). 
53  It is likely that the dataset includes substantially all published enforcement or 
“confirmation” proceedings in the U.S. federal courts involving foreign arbitral 
awards covered by the New York Convention.  However, the search might not 
have captured all decisions where the issue was strictly whether an enforcement 
decision should be “adjourned” under Article VI of the New York Convention 
pending the outcome of “an application for the setting aside or suspension of the 
award [that] has been made to a competent authority” of the country in which, 
or under the law of which, that award was made, because some of these 
decisions might refer to neither Section 207 of the FAA nor Article V of the 
Convention.  Moreover, some decisions involving non-domestic awards made in 
the United States and covered by the New York Convention might not have 
been captured by the search queries, since such decisions might be resolved 
under Chapter 1 of the FAA without referencing Section 207 of the FAA or 
Article V of the Convention. 
54  The remaining 9 appellate court decisions were published in Westlaw but not in 
the Federal Reporter.  
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the Federal Reporter.55  Therefore, the overall number of decisions is 
almost certainly greater than 45.  The overall number of decisions can 
be estimated using data on publication rates in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals. Until the 1970s, the courts of appeals published “a 
substantial majority” of their opinions in the Federal Reporter.56  But, 
by the late 1970s, the publication rate had fallen to 50 percent and, by 
the late 1980s, the rate had fallen to 33 percent.57 According to the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the publication rate had 
fallen to 16.5 percent in 2007.58  As an example, given 4 decisions 
published in the Federal Reporter in the 1980s and a 33 percent 
publication rate, the estimated total number of decisions for that 
decade would be 12.59 
 
                                                 
55  Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001) 
(noting that nearly 80% of all U.S. appellate court dispositions on the merits are 
unpublished). 
56  Id. at 75. 
57 Id. 
58  JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR tbl. S-3 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/ 
judbus.html.  See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation 
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 126 (2002) (“The publication rate for even the 
heavily published decisions of the federal courts of appeals has dipped from almost 
50% in 1976 to just over 20% in 2000.”). 
59  This figure is calculated as follows: Total Decisions*Publication Rate=Total 
Published Decisions; Total Decisions=Total Published Decisions/Publication Rate; 
so for the 1980s, Total Published Decisions=4/.33=12. 
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Using this method, Table 2 estimates that there have been 206 
U.S. Court of Appeals enforcement decisions involving arbitral 
awards covered by the New York Convention.60  To show the basis 
for calculating these estimates, Table 2 also presents the number of 
decisions published in the Federal Reporter, estimated publication 
rates for the 1970s and 1980s,61 and circuit-by-circuit publication 
rates for the 1990s and 2000s.62 
 
                                                 
60  To the extent U.S. federal court decisions regarding confirmation or enforcement 
of arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention are published at a lower 
rate than U.S. appellate court decisions overall, this analysis may underestimate 
post-award litigation (or vice versa). This former possibility is a particularly 
significant risk.  Prior studies on federal court publication rates suggest that 
decisions are more likely to be published in cases that are complex and novel.  See 
C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 120 (1996) (“the greater the complexity and/or novelty of the 
case, the greater the likelihood that it would be offered for publication by the 
judges”); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: 
A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 
24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1150 (1990) (“As we predicted . . . , the cases with 
published decisions tend to be more complex as evidenced by a number of different 
factors,” including the thickness of the case file, the number of plaintiffs, factual 
complexity, the amount in controversy.). But post-award confirmation and 
enforcement proceedings are generally understood as being simple and straight-
forward.  See, e.g., Susan Wiens & Roger Haydock, Confirming Arbitration 
Awards: Taking the Mystery out of a Summary Proceeding, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1293, 1294 (“[W]hen parties seek confirmation, they do not relinquish the 
efficiency they gained through arbitration because the confirmation process is as 
simple and straightforward as the arbitration itself and, of course, much simpler than 
litigation.”); Hewlett-Packard, Inc. v. Berg, 867 F. Supp. 1126, 1130-1131 (D. 
Mass. 1994) (“[enforcement proceedings] are meant to be summary in nature. . . . 
The decisions of the [arbitral] panel cannot be reviewed for errors in law or fact.”).  
Therefore, a reasonable approach would be to treat these estimates as estimates of 
the minimum number of relevant decisions. 
61  The publication rate estimates for the 1970s and 1980s are from Merritt & 
Brudney, supra note 55, at 75. 
62  The publication rates for the 1990s and 2000s are based on Table S-3 of the 
annual statistical reports of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html. Table S-3 tracks year-by-year 
the percent of published and unpublished U.S. Courts of Appeals opinions or orders 
filed in cases terminated on the merits after oral hearings or submissions on briefs.  
Because circuit-by-circuit data is not available for 1990-1996, the publication rates 
for the 1990s were calculated using the average rates for 1997-1999; and because 
2008 data is not yet available, the publication rates for 2000-2008 were calculated 
using the average rates for 2000-2007. 
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Turning to the district courts, since 1970, approximately 63 U.S. 
District Court enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards 
covered by the New York Convention have been published in the 
Federal Supplement and approximately 145 have been published in 
the Westlaw database.63  However, like appellate court decisions, only 
a small portion of district court decisions are published.  It is therefore 
again necessary to use data on publication rates to estimate the total 
number of district court decisions. 
 
According to Rowland and Carp, “less than 5 percent of all 
district court opinions ever appear in print.”64 In a study of the 
Minnesota federal district court between 1982 and 1984, Olson found 
that the overall Lexis publication rate was 5.3 percent for civil cases, 
and 2.9 percent for contract cases in particular.65 Levin defines 
publication as “available on Westlaw or Lexis” and concludes that 
“[e]ven using this broad definition, only between 5% and 20% of 
substantive opinions are published, and virtually no procedural orders 
are.”66  Swenson notes that “[f]ederal district court judges release 
fewer than 20 percent of their written opinions for publication” in 
Westlaw or Lexis.67  In another study, Siegelman and Donohue found 
that, in seven districts between 1973 and 1987, Lexis publication rates 
averaged 8.1 percent.68 The same study suggested that publication 
rates may be increasing.69 However, Clermont and Eisenberg state 
                                                 
63 The number of decisions in the Westlaw database include the decisions published 
in the Federal Supplement. 
64 ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 60, at 16.  It is unclear whether their reference to 
“in print” refers to the Federal Supplement only or includes decisions published in 
electronic databases. 
65 Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A 
Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 788-790 (1992).  Because most transnational 
arbitration is based on arbitration clauses in transnational contracts, it is likely that 
many, if not most, district court decisions regarding confirmation or enforcement of 
transnational arbitral awards would be included in the contract case category. 
66 Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. _, 13 (forthcoming 2008)   (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006101). 
67 Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 
JUST. SYS. J. 121, 122 (2004). 
68 Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 60, at 1143 tbl. 1. 
69 Id. at 1140 (defining the publication rate as the percentage of cases appearing in 
LEXIS, and noting an increase in the publication rate for employment 
discrimination cases in the Northern District of Illinois between 1974-1986). 
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that “[m]ost district court opinions and decisions . . . still do not 
appear in print or in Westlaw.”70 In summary, it appears that 
publication rates since the 1970s have ranged from approximately 3 
percent to 20 percent, with Federal Supplement publication rates 
presumably lower—perhaps much lower—than Westlaw publication 
rates since Westlaw includes not only all decisions published in the 
Federal Supplement but also decisions that are not published in the 
Federal Supplement.71  
 
Table 3 shows that estimates of the total number of decisions 
could range from 630 to 2,900, depending on two factors: (1) whether 
the estimate is based on the number of decisions published in 
Westlaw or the number of decisions published in the Federal 
Supplement and (2) the assumed publication rate.72 The table indicates 
the number of decisions published in each source by decade (for 
                                                 
70  Kevin M. Clermont &Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and 
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1559, n. 10 (2008).  In another study, Lizotte 
analyzed publication rates in 8 districts for grants of summary judgment motions in 
2000, and found that 12% were published in either the Federal Supplement or 
Federal Rules Decisions and 40% were available in Westlaw or Lexis. Brian N. 
Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by 
Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 124-125, 130 (2007). However, 
because publication rates vary by case type, it is unclear whether these figures 
represent publication rates in general.  See, e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 
60, at 1143 tbl. 1 (in the districts and period covered by the study, the publication 
rate in employment discrimination cases was 21.7%, whereas the rate in civil cases 
overall was 8.1%).  One possible reason for higher publication rates for certain 
types of cases is that those cases are on average more complex and novel.  See id. at 
1150 (“As we predicted . . . , the cases with published decisions tend to be more 
complex as evidenced by a number of different factors,” including the thickness of 
the case file, the number of plaintiffs, factual complexity, the amount in 
controversy.). 
71  As Lizotte explains, Lexis and Westlaw generally publish most of the decisions 
received from the district courts, regardless of whether they are published in the 
Federal Supplement.  Lizotte, supra note 70, at 132-133.  As illustrated by his data 
on summary judgment grants, this can result in very large differences between 
Federal Supplement publication rates (12% in his study) and Lexis/Westlaw 
publication rates (40% in his study). 
72  Because the existing studies suggest that Westlaw publication rates are at least 
5%, and do not indicate that Federal Supplement publication rates are as high as 
20%, the cells in Table 3 that correspond to these combinations of factors are left 
empty. If included, the high-end estimate would increase to 4,833 decisions (3%, 
145 decisions published in Westlaw) and the low-end estimate would decrease to 
315 decisions (20%, 63 decisions published in Federal Supplement). 
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example, N=51 under Westlaw for the 1990s indicates that there were 
51 relevant decisions published in Westlaw during that period). The 
assumed publication rates are indicated in the publication rate (“Pub. 
Rate”) column.73 
 
To help determine which Table 3 estimates are most plausible, they 
were compared to an estimate based on an analysis of appeal rates and 
the number of appellate court decisions. Only a small percentage of 
district court decisions are appealed. Therefore, to generate 206 U.S. 
Court of Appeals enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards 
covered by the New York Convention, there must be a substantially 
larger number of underlying district court decisions.  Prior studies 
indicate that the rate at which district court judgments entered without 
trial are appealed and the appeal results in a decision on the merits is 
approximately 10 percent.74 In my post-award litigation dataset, 
                                                 
73  As with appellate court decisions, to the extent U.S. federal court decisions 
regarding confirmation or enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the New York 
Convention are published at a lower rate than U.S. federal court decisions overall, 
this analysis would underestimate post-award litigation (or vice versa). As discussed 
above, if courts are more likely to publish complex and novel cases, and arbitral 
award enforcement cases are generally understood as simple and routine, a 
reasonable approach would be to interpret estimates based on publication rates to be 
estimates of the minimum number of relevant decisions.  See supra note 70. 
74  See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried 
Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMP. LEG. 
STUD. 659, 664 tbl. 1 (2004) (10.2% of district court judgments without trial are 
appealed and result in the appeals court entering an order affirming or reversing the 
district court from 1987-1995). The rate for contract cases in particular (which 
likely include a substantial number of arbitration cases) also appears to be around 
10%.  Id. at 674 fig. 5. 
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approximately 15 percent of district court enforcement decisions were 
appealed.75  Based on an appellate rate of between 10 and 15 percent 
and an estimated 206 U.S. Court of Appeals enforcement decisions, 
there would be an estimated 1,373 to 2,060 U.S. District Court 
enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards covered by the New 
York Convention.76  This supplemental analysis suggests that the 
actual number of district court decisions is likely in the middle range 
of the estimates presented in Table 3.  Combining the two analyses, a 
reasonable estimate of the actual number of U.S. District Court 
decisions regarding the confirmation or enforcement of arbitral 
awards covered by the New York Convention since 1970 is between 
roughly 1,200 and 2,100. 
 
Table 3 also shows that post-award litigation appears to be 
increasing over time.  The estimated number of U.S. Court of Appeals 
enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards covered by the New 
York Convention doubled from the 1970s to the 1980s; increased 
almost five-fold from the 1980s to the 1990s; and has already doubled 
from the 1990s to the still-not-completed 2000s.  The number of U.S. 
District Court enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards covered 
by the New York Convention appears to have doubled from the 1970s 
to the 1980s, roughly doubled again from the 1980s to the 1990s, and 
increased by at least one-third to one-half from the 1990s to the still-
not-completed 2000s. However, without a better understanding of 
changes in district court publication rates over time, the extent of the 
upward trend in the district courts is uncertain. To the extent 
publication rates have increased over time, Table 3 would overstate the 
increase in total decisions, and to the extent publication rates have 
decreased over time, Table 3 would understate the upward trend. 
 
Together with the evidence presented in Part II, this Part’s 
evidence suggests that a significant portion of the increase in post-
award litigation rates may be due to increases in transnational 
arbitration rather than increased per-arbitration rates of judicial 
involvement. As discussed in Part II, institutional arbitration rates 
                                                 
75  21 of 145 U.S. district court enforcement decisions in my dataset were appealed.  
An additional 3 decisions were appealed on issues other than the enforcement 
decision. 
76  This estimate is calculated as follows: District Court Decisions*Appeal 
Rate=Appeals; District Court Decisions=Appeals/Appeal Rate; District Court 
Decisions=206/.10=2,060 (assuming a 10% enforcement rate) or 206/.15=1,373 
(using a 15% enforcement rate). 
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have increased steadily. Transnational arbitration cases under the 
auspices of the AAA have doubled from the 1990s to 2000-2008.  In 
the same period, ICC arbitrations have increased by approximately 20 
percent and arbitrations in the major arbitral institutions overall have 
increased by approximately 40 percent.77 Meanwhile, U.S. District 
Court enforcement decisions involving arbitral awards covered by the 
New York Convention increased by approximately 35 to 50 percent,78 
and U.S. Court of Appeals decisions appear to have more than 
doubled.79  The implication is that some, but not all, of the increase in 
post-award litigation rates in the U.S. federal courts can probably be 
explained by parallel increases in transnational arbitration rates.80 
 
                                                 
77  See HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, supra note 25 
(providing filing rates in the major international arbitral tribunals).  Because data 
are unavailable for 1990 and 1991, I assumed 200, 330 and 1,100 (the approximate 
numbers for 1992) arbitrations in the AAA, ICC and the major arbitral institutions 
overall, respectively, for those years.  Because data are not yet available for 2008, 
and because the court decisions included in my dataset include only a portion of 
2008, I used 50% of the 2007 figures to estimate arbitrations through the middle of 
2008. 
78  See supra Table 3.  Using decisions published in Westlaw, there was a 35% 
increase (from 51 in the 1990s to 69 in the 2000-2008 period), and using decisions 
published in the Federal Supplement, there was a 50% increase (from 18 in the 
1990s to 27 in the 2000-2008 period). 
79  See supra Table 2 (the increase was from an estimated 56 total decisions in the 
1990s to an estimated 132 decisions in the period 2000-2008).  The increase in the 
number of decisions published in the Federal Reporter was from 15 in the 1990s to 
23 in the period 2000-2008, representing a roughly 50% increase; but due to 
differing publication rates across circuits, this figure may not be as reliable as the 
figure based on the estimated total decisions. 
80  A comparison of arbitration rates and post-award litigation rates in two five-year 
periods yields similar results.  Comparing the five-year period between 1995 and 
1999 and the five-year period between 2000 and 2004, the number of cases filed in 
the major arbitral institutions increased by 26%; the number of U.S. Court of 
Appeals enforcement decisions involving awards covered by the New York 
Convention and published in the Federal Reporter increased by 27%; the estimated 
overall number of such Court of Appeals decisions increased by 95%; the number 
of U.S. District Court enforcement decisions involving awards covered by the New 
York Convention published in the Federal Supplement increased by 70%; and the 
number of such District Court decisions published in Westlaw increased by 23%.  
All of these comparisons are consistent with the proposition that part of the increase 
in post-award litigation is due to increases in transnational arbitration; but the higher 
estimates of post-award litigation increases suggest that there are also other reasons 
for the increase. 
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Overall, these findings indicate that there is a considerable amount 
of post-award litigation involving arbitral awards covered by the New 
York Convention.  Whether there is too much post-award litigation is 
more difficult to determine, particularly in the absence of data on the 
underlying number of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards.  
Assuming that at least some transnational arbitration is bound to 
result in post-award litigation, high post-award litigation rates may 
simply reflect high arbitration rates. Nevertheless, the findings 
suggest that disputants often seek judicial involvement in the 
transnational arbitration process, and that courts therefore often have 
an opportunity to monitor the integrity of the arbitration system. At 
the same time, the findings do not suggest that there is necessarily 
excessive judicial involvement.81  The findings also suggest that post-
award litigation may be increasing. These trends might be interpreted 
as reflecting decreasing levels of legitimacy and private enforcement 
capacity of the transnational arbitration system, but they may also 
reflect increased opportunities for judicial monitoring which could 
work to enhance the system’s legitimacy and increase the attractiveness 
of arbitration as a method of transnational dispute resolution. 
 
IV.  ENFORCEMENT RATES IN THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 
 
Part III suggests that an important dimension of the arbitration-
litigation relationship in transnational dispute resolution is the role of 
domestic courts in post-award litigation. But does this judicial 
involvement tend to support or undermine transnational arbitration?  
On the one hand, domestic courts can provide support by creating 
opportunities for judicial monitoring of system integrity and disputant 
access to judicial review, which in turn might enhance the legitimacy 
of the transnational arbitration system. On the other hand, excessive 
                                                 
81  One point of reference is transnational arbitration under the auspices of the AAA.  
Between 1990 and 2008, there were an estimated 7,753 transnational arbitration 
cases in the AAA and 1,500 U.S. District Court enforcement decisions involving 
arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention—roughly one post-award 
enforcement action for every five transnational arbitration cases in the AAA.  Of 
course, not every district court decision involves a AAA arbitral award (in my 
dataset, approximately 10% of decisions in which an arbitral institution was 
identified involved an award made pursuant to a AAA arbitration), and not all AAA 
arbitrations that result in post-award litigation result in litigation in U.S. courts 
(however, the Naimark and Keer study discussed above suggests that AAA 
arbitrations frequently result in post-award litigation, see supra notes 48-50 and 
accompanying text). If post-award litigation rates were truly excessive, however, 
one might expect this ratio to be higher. 
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judicial involvement would risk undermining the system by 
increasing dispute resolution time and expenses, and possibly by 
reducing the flexibility and privacy of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution process. Beyond these basic tradeoffs, however, the 
consequences of judicial involvement ultimately depend on the 
willingness of courts to confirm and enforce arbitral awards.82 As a 
step toward understanding these consequences, this Part examines 
judicial enforcement rates for arbitral awards covered by the New 
York Convention. 
 
A.   Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention 
A major goal of transnational arbitration is the finality of arbitral 
awards.83  Consistent with this goal, a basic premise of the system is 
the supposed pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention.84  
Article III of the Convention states the general rule that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and 
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory 
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the 
[Convention].” Article V spells out a series of exceptions to this 
general rule: 
 
1.  Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, 
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only 
if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the 
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement [to arbitrate] were, under 
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or 
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award 
was made; or 
                                                 
82  Hereinafter, I will refer to confirmation and enforcement as “enforcement.”  But 
see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (explaining the technical differences 
between confirmation and enforcement). 
83  See MOSES, supra note 37, at 193 (“One of the touted advantages of an 
arbitration is finality of the award . . . .”). 
84  See, e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that the New York Convention helps 
create a “‘pro-enforcement’ regime, with only limited grounds for denying 
recognition to an arbitral award”); MOSES, supra note 37, at 3 (“The New York 
Convention is considered to have a pro-enforcement bias . . . .”). 
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(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator 
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by 
or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond 
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, 
if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can 
be separated from those not so submitted, that part of 
the award which contains decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and 
enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or 
has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made. 
2.  Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also 
be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The 
subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary 
to the public policy of that country. 
Moreover, according to Article VI, “[i]f an application for the setting 
aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent 
authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority before which the 
award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, 
adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, 
on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, 
order the other party to give suitable security.” 
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By enforcing arbitral awards, domestic courts can promote finality 
in two ways.85  First, from a disputant-oriented perspective, they do so 
by enforcing awards for particular award creditors against particular 
award debtors in particular disputes. Second, from a broader 
governance-oriented perspective, domestic courts can promote finality 
by enforcing arbitral awards at a high rate in their published 
enforcement decisions. By doing so, they not only enforce specific 
awards, but they also send a signal to transnational actors in general 
that award debtors are unlikely to prevail in efforts to avoid 
enforcement, thus reducing the likelihood that award debtors will 
challenge arbitral awards in court in the first place.86  In contrast, if 
judicial enforcement rates are too low, domestic courts can undermine 
finality not only in particular cases, but also—to the extent 
enforcement decisions are published—by increasing the expectations 
of transnational actors in general that domestic courts are likely to 
decline enforcement of arbitral awards, which in turn may increase 
post-award litigation and thus possibly reduce the attractiveness of 
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 
 
Enforcement in individual cases is obviously important, but 
enforcement rates in published decisions are likely to have 
                                                 
85  In theory, enforcement of arbitral awards might not have to depend on courts.  
For example, some scholars argue that purely private enforcement may be possible 
based on reputational sanctions.  See generally Benson, supra note 3, at 95; Stone 
Sweet, Transnational Governance, supra note 3, at 325.  However, reputational 
sanctions are likely to be effective in only a narrow set of circumstances. See 
Whytock, supra note 2, at 467-468 (explaining the conditions necessary for 
effective reputational enforcement). 
86  See Christian Bühring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in 
International Business Disputes, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 25, 37 (Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Richard W. Naimark eds. 2005) (“Although there are no data available on why 
parties comply voluntarily, it is plausible to assume that an effective enforcement 
mechanism operates as a strong motivation.”); Whytock, supra note 2, at 470 
(“[T]ransnational arbitration to an important extent still relies on domestic courts for 
enforcement.  This does not mean that arbitration agreements and arbitral awards 
necessarily go unheeded without judicial recourse. Rather, because of the strong 
pro-enforcement policy embodied by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, transnational 
actors expect that domestic courts ordinarily will enforce these agreements and 
awards, and are therefore more likely to comply with them voluntarily.  It is more 
by creating this knowledge than by providing enforcement in particular cases that 
domestic courts support arbitration as a system of transnational private 
governance.”). For a more general discussion of the governance-oriented 
perspective, see Whytock, supra note 8, pt. III. 
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disproportionately strong systemic effects on transnational arbitration 
by affecting the likelihood of compliance without any judicial 
involvement at all. If the proposition that most disputes are settled in 
the “shadow of the law” rather than in court applies to disputes over 
arbitral awards,87 then the aggregate impact of published decisions on 
the transnational arbitration system is probably greater than that of 
unpublished decisions, even if the latter are more numerous.  
Furthermore, because transnational actors generally have access to 
published but not unpublished decisions,88 the former will influence 
perceptions of transnational arbitration whether or not they are 
representative of the latter. Other things being equal, judicial 
involvement should tend to support the transnational arbitration 
system if enforcement rates are sufficiently high, but risk 
undermining the system if these rates are too low—particularly in 
published decisions. 
 
B.   The Data 
 
Existing scholarship generally suggests that enforcement rates are 
high. As Born argues, “[i]n the vast majority of reported decisions 
under Article V of the [New York] Convention, courts have enforced 
foreign arbitral awards. . . . Although there are instances where 
international arbitral awards have been denied enforcement, these 
cases are the exception rather than the rule.”89  In addition, in a multi-
                                                 
87  See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51, 968 (1979); 
see also Martin Shapiro, Courts, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: 
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 321, 329 (Fred I. Greenstein & 
Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (“[L]egalized bargaining [or negotiation] under the 
shadow supervision of an available court . . . is not purely mediatory, because the 
bargain struck will depend in part on the ‘legal’ strength of the parties, that is, 
predictions of how each would fare in court.”).  For an application of the “shadow 
of the law” concept to transnational activity, including transnational arbitration, see 
Whytock, supra note 8, pt. II. 
88  See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at 
the Process, 14 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 96-97 (2004) (noting that an 
unpublished decision “is, more or less, a letter from the court to the parties familiar 
with the facts . . . [which] is not written in a way that will be fully intelligible to 
those unfamiliar with the case”) (citing Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176, 
1178 (9th Cir. 2001)); Levin, supra note 66, at 11 (“[U]npublished district court 
opinions are not meaningfully available for review and study by anyone.”). 
89 BORN, supra note 13, at 115.  See also MOSES, supra note 37, at 3 (arguing that 
“[m]ost courts will interpret the permissible grounds for non-enforcement quite 
narrowly, leading to the enforcement of the vast majority of awards”). 
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country review of court decisions reported in the Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration between 1976 and 2007, van den Berg 
concludes that worldwide enforcement rates are approximately 90 
percent.90  On the other hand, in a survey of general corporate counsel 
conducted in 2007 and 2008, only 44 percent of respondents reported 
that efforts to enforce arbitral awards usually resulted in full recovery 
of arbitral awards.91 
 
To shed additional light on enforcement rates in the U.S. federal 
courts, each decision in the dataset described in Part III was coded 
based on whether it was a decision to enforce the arbitral award in full 
or not.92  If the decision was to enforce in full, the decision was coded 
as “yes;” otherwise, the decision was coded as “no.”  The rationale for 
this coding rule is that U.S. courts fail to further the goal of finality of 
arbitral awards not only when they definitively decide that an award 
should not be enforced at all, but also when they enforce an award 
only in part, or when they decline to make a definitive ruling on 
enforcement pending further district court proceedings or parallel 
proceedings in a foreign court.93 
                                                 
90  See Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of 
Enforcement, 18 ICC INT’L COURT OF ARB. BULL. 1, 35 (2007) (available at 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12125877992500/2007_icc_bulletin_aj_van 
_den_berg_denials_of_enforcement.pdf) (finding that out of approximately 700 
enforcement decisions by domestic courts, only 10 percent refused enforcement).  
The Yearbook does not report all enforcement decisions.  Id. at 1.  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the enforcement rate in decisions reported in the Yearbook is 
similar to, greater than, or less than in enforcement decisions overall. 
91  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 47, at 12.  Forty percent reported that 
they usually recovered at least 75% of the award.  Id.  The survey results do not 
indicate the extent to which less-than-full recovery is a result of less-than-full 
judicial enforcement, but survey-related interviews suggest that lack of assets on the 
part of the award debtor is the main reason.  Id.  The survey was based on online 
questionnaires completed by 82 respondents in 2007 and 2008, and 47 interviews 
conducted in 2008.  Id. at 18-19. 
92  Coding of enforcement decisions was performed by law student research 
assistants and verified by the author.  A preliminary analysis suggests that 
enforcement rates may be substantially higher for awards made in the United States 
(an estimated 88% for such awards compared to 68% for non-U.S. awards).  This 
hints at the possibility that arbitral awards made in the United States may fare better 
in U.S. courts than those made outside the United States.  Moreover, if, as suggested 
above, awards made in the United States are underrepresented in the dataset, the 
dataset might underestimate overall enforcement rates. 
93 An alternative coding scheme might focus not so much on the extent to which 
courts promote the goal of finality, but rather on final decisions themselves.  Such 
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Applying this coding rule, decisions coded as “yes” include not 
only district court decisions enforcing an arbitral award in full, but 
also appellate court decisions affirming such district court decisions, 
and appellate court decisions reversing district court decisions not to 
enforce and remanding them with instructions to enforce.  District 
court decisions coded as “no” include decisions not to enforce at all, 
decisions to enforce only partially, and decisions under Article VI of 
the New York Convention to stay enforcement proceedings pending 
the outcome of parallel foreign proceedings to vacate or set aside an 
award.94  Appellate court decisions coded as “no” include decisions 
affirming such district court decisions, and appellate court decisions 
reversing district court decisions (except reversals accompanied by 
instructions to enforce).95 
 
It is important to reemphasize that the dataset includes only 
published U.S. federal court decisions—that is, decisions appearing 
in the Federal Reporter, the Federal Supplement, or the Westlaw 
database. The analysis can therefore directly reveal enforcement 
rates in published decisions.  Because these decisions are likely to 
have a disproportionately important impact on the transnational 
arbitration system, they merit special attention.96 But because 
published decisions are not necessarily representative of 
unpublished decisions, this Part’s analysis can only provide clues 
about overall enforcement rates. 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
a coding scheme would separately count partial enforcements, and exclude 
decisions to stay because such decisions are not final.  Results using this 
alternative final decisions coding scheme are reported in the text below for 
comparison purposes. 
94  As a result, one appellate court decision and five district court decisions resulting 
in partial but not full enforcement were coded as “no.”  In addition, two appellate 
court decisions and seven district court decisions resulting in a stay of proceedings 
pending the outcome of parallel foreign vacatur proceedings were coded as “no” 
because they were not decisions to enforce. 
95  As a result, appellate court decisions coded as “no” include not only five 
decisions reversing and remanding district court decisions to enforce, but also one 
decision reversing and remanding a decision not to enforce (without instructions to 
enforce), and one two-part decision which affirmed a district court decision to 
enforce and reversed and remanded a district court decision not to enforce (without 
instructions to enforce). 
96 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
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C.   Analysis 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.  The full enforcement rate in 
published U.S. federal court decisions involving awards covered by 
the New York Convention is 73.9 percent.  In the U.S. District Courts, 
the rate is 77.2 percent, and in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the rate is 
64.8 percent. In 3.0 percent of decisions (3.5 percent in the U.S. 
District Courts, 1.9 percent in the U.S. Courts of Appeals), the court 
either partially enforced an award or stayed enforcement proceedings.  
In the remaining 23.1 percent of decisions (19.3 percent in the U.S. 
District Courts, 33.3 percent in the U.S. Courts of Appeals), the court 
decided that the award should not be enforced. 
 
Table 4. Enforcement Rates (U.S. District Courts and U.S. Courts of 
Appeals) 
 
Court Type Award Fully 





















Notes: This table presents the rates at which U.S. federal courts fully 
enforce arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention in 
published decisions between 1970 and 2008. 
 
On the one hand, these results confirm that, at least in published 
decisions, U.S. federal courts enforce arbitral awards covered by the 
New York Convention more often than not. On the other hand, the 
enforcement rates might be unexpectedly low in light of the general 
sense that domestic courts enforce a vast majority of arbitral awards.97  
One might question whether these enforcement rates are sufficiently 
high from the perspective of finality and the New York Convention’s 
supposed pro-enforcement bias, and whether they truly signal to 
transnational actors that judicial challenges to arbitral awards will 
                                                 
97 This finding challenges the author’s assumption in earlier work that courts 
primarily play a facilitating role in transnational arbitration, and have largely 
abdicated their supervisory role.  See Whytock, supra note 2, at 469 (“Even if 
domestic courts facilitate transnational arbitration by providing enforcement 
support, it is undeniable that domestic courts have, to a substantial degree, 
emancipated the arbitration process form judicial monitoring.”). 
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rarely be successful.  If, based on published decisions, award debtors 
perceive that in roughly 25 percent of cases they will be able to avoid 
or delay full enforcement, it would not be surprising to find a 
significant amount of post-award litigation. Moreover, these results 
may indicate that the U.S. federal courts are lagging behind the rest of 
the world: The enforcement rates are significantly lower than van den 
Berg’s 90 percent multi-country finding, which also was based on 
analysis of published decisions.98 
 
As Table 5 indicates, full enforcement rates in published U.S. 
federal court decisions increased from approximately 72 percent in 
the 1970s-1980s period to approximately 83 percent in the 1990s, and 
then dropped to approximately 68 percent in the 2000s.99  
Enforcement in published decisions was more likely in the 1990s and 
less likely in the 2000s compared to the other periods.100  Much of 
this movement is due to changes in district court enforcement rates.  
After increasing from 64 percent in the 1970s-1980s period to 
approximately 90 percent in the 1990s, the district court enforcement 
rate dropped to 73 percent in the 2000-2008 period.101  Meanwhile, 
the appellate court enforcement rate has remained roughly level since 
the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
98  See van den Berg, supra note 90 at 35. 
99  Pearson chi-squared tests indicate that the difference between the 1990s and the 
2000s is statistically significant at traditionally accepted levels of confidence 
(p=.030), but not the difference between the 1970s-1980s period and the 1990s 
(p=.187). 
100 A bivariate logit test with enforcement as the dependent variable and a dummy 
variable for the 1990s as the independent variable results in a positive coefficient 
(p=.035), and a substantive estimate that enforcement was 14.2% more likely in the 
1990s than the other periods (with a 95% confidence interval of 2.2% to 26.1%).  
Much of this difference appears to be driven by district court enforcement decisions: 
when the same logit test is restricted to the district courts, the result is again a 
positive coefficient (p=.009), with the estimated substantive effect now 20% (and a 
95% confidence interval of 7.7% to 32.3%).  The same test (with both the district 
and appellate courts) using a dummy variable for the 2000s as the independent 
variable results in a negative coefficient (p=.072), and estimates that enforcement 
was 11.3% less likely in the 2000s than in the other periods (with a 95% confidence 
interval of -23.4% to .008%)—results which are not quite statistically significant at 
a 95% level of confidence. 
101 Pearson chi-squared tests indicate that these differences are statistically 
significant (p=.006 for the difference between the 1970s-1980s period and the 
1990s, and p=.016 for the difference between the 1990s and 2000s). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1417627
&76 WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REVIEW [VOL. 2:5 
 
Table 5. Enforcement Rates over Time (U.S. District Courts and U.S. 


































Notes: This table compares the rate at which U.S. federal courts fully 
enforced arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention in 
published decisions over three periods: the 1970s-1980s, the 1990s, and 
the 2000-2008 period. 
 
Award debtors invoked almost all of the New York Convention’s 
exceptions to enforcement with some frequency, including Article 
V(1)(a) (incapacity of a party or invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement),102 Article V(1)(b) (lack of proper notice or inability of a 
party to present its case),103 Article V(1)(c) (award beyond scope of 
the submission to arbitration),104 Article V(1)(e) (award set aside or 
not yet binding),105 Article V(2)(b) (award contrary to public 
policy),106 and Article VI (pending action to set aside in state of 
origin).107  These exceptions can be understood as accounting for a 
substantial portion of post-award litigation in published decisions; but 
only two individual exceptions account for more than 3 percent of 
non-enforcement decisions: Article V(1)(e) (which was a ground for 
non-enforcement in an estimated 3.5 percent of decisions) and Article 
VI (which was a ground for non-enforcement in an estimated 4.5 
percent of decisions). This suggests that no single exception is 
disproportionately leading to non-enforcement. 
                                                 
102 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 19% of cases. 
103 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 25% of cases. 
104 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 21% of cases. 
105 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 13% of cases. 
106 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 29% of cases. 
107 This exception was raised by the award debtor in an estimated 8% of cases. 
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As discussed above, published decisions may merit special 
attention; but it is well known that most court decisions are not 
published and that published decisions are not necessarily 
representative of court decisions in general.108  Therefore, one must 
use caution if one wishes to generalize this Part’s findings to 
unpublished enforcement decisions.109 Regarding absolute enforcement 
rates, the risk is that judges may be more likely to publish decisions to 
enforce than decisions not to enforce (in which case the findings 
would overstate enforcement rates in unpublished decisions) or vice 
versa (in which case they would understate enforcement rates in 
unpublished decisions).  Prior research on judicial publication patterns 
suggests that publication rates are likely higher for decisions which 
create or criticize law than for “more mundane applications of 
law;”110 higher for decisions involving particularly complex and 
difficult legal and factual issues,111 measured, for example, by the 
thickness of the case file, the dollar amount at stake, or the number of 
plaintiffs;112 higher for decisions that highlight legal issues that the 
market or the judge deems to be important;113 higher for decisions 
favoring plaintiffs rather than defendants114 and reversals rather than 
affirmances;115 and higher for decisions that lean in the judge’s 
ideologically preferred direction.116   
 
                                                 
108 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 125-126 (noting that published 
decisions are a small and skewed sample of judicial decisions). 
109  For a more detailed discussion of the conditions under which the 
unrepresentativeness of published court decisions is likely to create biased 
descriptive and causal inferences, see Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? 
International Choice of Law in Action, 84 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW pt. 
V.B (forthcoming 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/author=386558). 
110  Lizotte, supra note 70, at 146. 
111 Id.; ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 60, at 121; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 
60, at 1150. 
112 Id. at 1150 et seq. 
113 Lizotte, supra note 70, at 146; Olson, supra note 65, at 797. 
114 Lizotte, supra note 70, at 146. 
115 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 58, at 126. 
116 David S. Law, Judicial Ideology and the Decision to Publish: Voting and 
Publication Patterns in Ninth Circuit Asylum Cases, 89 JUDICATURE 1, 2, 6 (2006). 
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Taking these factors into account, insofar as enforcement is more 
mundane than non-enforcement, one might speculate that decisions to 
enforce would be underrepresented in published decisions.117  On the 
other hand, because decisions to enforce favor claimants, one might 
speculate to the contrary: that decisions to enforce would be 
overrepresented in published decisions. There is not a statistically 
significant difference between enforcement rates in decisions 
published in the Federal Reporter or the Federal Supplement on the 
one hand, and decisions that appear only in Westlaw on the other 
hand;118 but this does not necessarily mean that there is no such 
difference when compared to decisions that are not published at all.  It 
is not clear whether other factors would systematically favor 
publication of decisions to enforce or decisions not to enforce. 
 
Even if enforcement is more (or less) likely in published decisions 
than unpublished decisions, it may still be possible to generalize the 
findings regarding trends over time to unpublished decisions if the 
difference between enforcement rates in the two sets of decisions does 
not significantly vary across the time periods being analyzed.119  For 
example, if enforcement rates were 10 percent higher (or lower) in 
published than unpublished decisions in the 1970s/1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s, estimates of absolute enforcement rates based on the published 
decisions would overstate (or understate) absolute enforcement rates 
in unpublished decisions, but the percentage changes in enforcement 
rates across those time periods would be the same. 
 
In summary, this Part’s findings suggest that at least in published 
decisions, U.S. federal courts might not enforce arbitral awards 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 5, at 264 (noting that “courts 
would seem much less likely to report decisions enforcing awards than decisions 
denying enforcement (because enforcement generally is routine)”). 
118 Pearson chi-squared tests of enforcement rates depending on publication in the 
official reporter are as follows: U.S. Courts of Appeals (66.7% if no, 64.4% if yes, 
p=.899), U.S. District Courts (79.3% if no, 74.6% if yes, p=.507), combined (78.0% 
if no, 70.4% if yes, p=.221). 
119 In other words, the unrepresentativeness of published opinions leads to selection 
bias in causal inferences if two conditions are satisfied: (1) a criterion used to select 
the sample upon which those inferences are based (whether a decision was 
published) is a cause of the dependent variable (whether the judge enforces an 
arbitral award) and (2) that criterion is correlated with an explanatory variable of 
interest (the time periods), but is not itself included as an explanatory variable in the 
model.  See Whytock, supra note 109, at pt. IV.D.1.b. 
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covered by the New York Convention at a level that is fully consistent 
with transnational arbitration’s goal of finality and the Convention’s 
supposed pro-enforcement bias.  However, higher-than-expected non-
enforcement rates may indicate that judges take their role as monitors 
of the transnational arbitration system’s integrity—a role contemplated 
by the New York Convention itself120—more seriously than is widely 
believed.  The findings also suggest that enforcement rates are higher 
in the U.S. District Courts than in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and that 
enforcement rates may have changed over time—in particular, 
enforcement rates in published U.S. District Court decisions appear to 
have declined significantly since the 1990s.  To speculate, perhaps 
this downward trend reflects efforts by the district courts to bring 
themselves more in line with appellate court enforcement patterns—
but given the U.S. Supreme Court’s strong pro-enforcement policy, 
this would be somewhat puzzling.  Because the decisions analyzed in 
this Part are more likely than unpublished decisions to influence the 
behavior of actual and prospective disputants beyond the parties to 
particular enforcement proceedings, they are especially important for 
the overall health of the transnational arbitration system.  However, 
before these findings can be generalized with confidence to 
unpublished enforcement decisions, further research will be necessary 
to determine the extent to which enforcement rates differ in published 
and unpublished decisions. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
This article has pursued empirical insights from the U.S. federal 
courts to shed light on the relationship between transnational 
arbitration and litigation. Although definitive results will require 
collection and analysis of additional data, this article’s analysis 
suggests several preliminary conclusions. Regarding the relationship 
between arbitration and litigation as alternative methods of 
transnational dispute resolution, the results confirm that arbitration in 
the world’s leading arbitral institutions has been increasing, while 
alienage litigation in the U.S. District Courts has been decreasing.  
However, the extent to which these trends reflect replacement of 
litigation with arbitration is unclear. The results also suggest that 
litigation continues to be a widely-used method of transnational 
dispute resolution—even in disputes arising out of contractual 
relationships, in which the parties could have agreed to arbitration ex 
                                                 
120 See infra note 122.  
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ante. The evidence suggests that, even as transnational arbitration has 
grown in importance, it has yet to fully eclipse transnational litigation.  
Although it may go against the grain of some pronouncements about 
the dominance of transnational arbitration, the conclusion that 
litigation continues to be widely used is consistent with the view that 
there is no one-size-fits-all method of transnational dispute resolution, 
and that the choice between arbitration and litigation ultimately 
depends on the circumstances.121 
 
This article also highlighted another important dimension of the 
relationship between arbitration and litigation: judicial involvement in 
the transnational arbitration process through post-award litigation.  
Because most federal court decisions are not published, it is difficult 
to estimate overall post-award litigation rates. However, by 
combining information about published U.S. federal court decisions 
involving arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention with 
assumptions about publication rates, Part III was able to narrow the 
range within which overall post-award litigation rates are likely to 
fall.  More precise results will require additional data. Nevertheless, 
the results seem to indicate considerable judicial involvement in the 
post-award phase of the transnational arbitration process. 
 
Finally, the article analyzed enforcement rates in published U.S. 
federal court decisions involving awards covered by the New York 
Convention to evaluate whether judicial involvement tends to support 
or undermine the transnational arbitration system. Although it is 
uncertain whether the results of this analysis can be extended to 
unpublished decisions, the results provide preliminary evidence 
suggesting that the U.S. federal courts usually enforce these awards, 
but that enforcement rates may be lower than commonly believed.  
The results also raise the question of whether prevailing enforcement 
rates in the U.S. federal courts are high enough to fulfill transnational 
arbitration’s promise of finality of awards, and whether they conform 
to the pro-enforcement policies of the New York Convention and the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  More troubling from the perspective of finality 
of arbitral awards is that enforcement rates—at least in published 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 13, at 4-15 (outlining the advantages and 
disadvantages of transnational litigation and transnational arbitration and the 
circumstances in which one may be preferable to the other, and stating that “[i]t 
would be highly imprudent to prescribe a single dispute resolution mechanism for 
all transactions or parties.  There are too many variables, which counsel in different 
directions in different transactions for different parties.”). 
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decisions of the U.S. District Courts—appear to have declined since 
the 1990s.  On the other hand, from the perspective of some critics of 
transnational arbitration, lower-than-expected enforcement rates 
might be good news, suggesting that courts have not entirely 
abdicated their supervisory role in the transnational arbitration 
system.122 In fact, judicial supervision—including judicial willingness 
to decline enforcement of arbitral awards when one of the New York 
Convention’s exceptions apply—may help compensate for what some 
commentators and consumers of dispute resolution services perceive 
to be a disadvantage of arbitration: the lack of a right of appeal.123  
From this perspective, the trends in judicial enforcement rates 
suggested by this article may be a welcome sign that the U.S. federal 
courts are improving the balance between finality and judicial 
supervision in a manner that might reinforce rather than undermine 
the status of arbitration as a leading method of transnational dispute 
resolution. 
 
                                                 
122 This supervisory role is implied by Article V of the New York Convention 
(which authorizes courts to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards under specified 
circumstances) and Article VI (which allows courts to defer enforcement 
proceedings if proceedings to set aside or suspend an award are pending in a court 
in the state of origin), as well as Section 207 of the FAA (which authorizes a court 
to decline enforcement if “it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of 
recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the [New York] Convention”). 
123 See BORN, supra note 13, at 6 (“Dispensing with appellate review reduces both 
litigation costs and delays.  On the other hand, it also means that a wildly eccentric, 
or simply wrong, arbitral decision cannot be corrected.”); MOSES, supra note 37, at 
4 (“[T]he lack of any right of appeal may be a benefit in terms of ending the dispute, 
but if an arbitrator has rendered a decision that is clearly wrong on the law or the 
facts, the lack of ability to bring an appeal can be frustrating to a party.”).  See also 
Rebecca Callahan, Arbitration v. Litigation: The Right to Appeal and Other 
Misperceptions Fueling the Preference for a Judicial Forum, bepress Legal Series 
Paper 1248, at 31, 49 (2006) (available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
expresso/eps/1248) (finding in a survey of approximately 400 business lawyers in 
Southern California that “the overwhelming majority of attorneys surveyed—84 
percent—prefer litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the time or more,” and that 
a major reason for this preference is the availability of appellate review in 
litigation).  To comply with Chapter 2 of the FAA, this supervisory role of U.S. 
courts must, with respect to foreign arbitral awards, be limited to the application of 
the exceptions to enforcement set forth in the New York Convention.  With respect 
to non-domestic awards made in the United States, judicial supervision might also 
take place through application of the provisions of Chapter 1 of the FAA. 
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